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ABSTRACT 
When a person dedicates his life to ending a practice he considers evil, 
the state should not force him to promote that evil. Ever since the Supreme 
Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette declared that 
the First Amendment right to speak naturally implied the right not to speak, 
the courts have sought to protect this right. As with all constitutional rights, 
the debate is now where to place its limits. In A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy 
Resource Clinic v. Harris, the Eastern District of California upheld an act 
requiring any organization that performs pregnancy testing to inform its 
clients that California provides low-cost access to abortions. The act 
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mandates that the notice be put in a conspicuous place where individuals 
wait and where it may be easily read by those seeking services from the 
organization. The court in A Woman’s Friend framed the issue as a conflict 
between the state’s ability to regulate the medical profession and the free 
speech rights of the organization.  
A couple years before A Woman’s Friend, the Second Circuit dealt with a 
similar situation. In Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, New York City 
passed a law that required pregnancy service centers to inform clients that 
the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene encourages 
women who are, or who may be, pregnant to consult with a licensed 
provider. The city’s act also required pregnancy service centers to tell their 
clients whether they provided abortions or provided referrals for abortions. 
The Second Circuit held that these two provisions passed neither strict nor 
intermediate scrutiny. The Second Circuit reasoned that the New York City 
law was forcing the pro-life organizations to advertise on behalf of the city. 
The court held that the government could not mandate that one espouse a 
government position on a contested public issue, finding that the city’s act 
failed under both strict and intermediate scrutiny. 
Contrarily, the court in A Woman’s Friend found that the California 
Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and 
Transparency Act (“the Act”) passed both intermediate and strict scrutiny. 
The court in A Woman’s Friend attempted to distinguished its case from 
Evergreen, and found that the California Act did not burden speech to the 
extent that the law did in Evergreen. The court reasoned that the Act sought 
to protect a different government interest that was more closely related to 
providing women with information regarding their pregnancy. The court 
found the Act’s language to be merely a neutral fact, not expressing an 
ideological message. The court also found that the Act was less burdensome 
on speech because the Act did not require actual speech, but only that the 
message be posted. 
But the Second Circuit’s Evergreen decision is not easily distinguishable 
from A Woman’s Friend. Just like the situation in Evergreen, the required 
postings in A Woman’s Friend compel a private organization to advertise on 
behalf of the state, and against the private organization’s will. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Following the passage of the California Reproductive Freedom, 
Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (“the Act”), A 
Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Resource Clinic discovered that it would have 
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to post a notice in its waiting room advertising that California provided 
low-cost abortions.1 This pro-life institution claimed that the Act violates 
the compelled speech doctrine and the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause.2 Supporting its assertion, A Woman’s Friend looked to a case from 
the Second Circuit, Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York.3 In that case, the 
Second Circuit reasoned that it did not need to resolve the level of scrutiny 
because the result would be the same under both intermediate and strict 
scrutiny.4 
The district court in A Woman’s Friend held that the Act satisfied both 
strict and intermediate scrutiny.5 The district court attempted to distinguish 
the case from the Second Circuit case in Evergreen, but the Ninth Circuit 
later undermined many of its distinctions.6 While discrediting the district 
court’s reasoning, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the core result of the district 
court due to the Ninth Circuit’s creation of the Pickup factors.7 These 
factors were designed to evaluate professional speech cases and the Ninth 
Circuit’s version of intermediate scrutiny.8 
The district court in A Woman’s Friend—and the Ninth Circuit in 
affirming the case—has created a split between the Ninth and the Second 
Circuits.9 To resolve this conflict, the reasoning of the Second Circuit 
should prevail. The Second Circuit’s reasoning in Evergreen is more 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance concerning compelled speech 
cases. It recognizes the policy against states commandeering private 
organizations for advertising purposes, and it recognizes the constitutional 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1179-80 
(E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d sub nom. A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 669 F. 
App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2016). When this writing process began, only the district court had ruled 
on A Woman’s Friend. As this Note was being written, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and 
within the past few weeks the Supreme Court of the United States has decided to hear the 
case. 
 2. Id. at 1179. 
 3. Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub 
nom. Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014), and cert. denied sub 
nom. Pregnancy Care Ctr. of N.Y. v. City of New York , 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014). 
 4. Evergreen, 740 F.3d at 245. 
 5. A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1206-07 
(E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d sub nom. A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 669 F. 
App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 6. See infra Section IV.B. 
 7. See infra Section III.C.4. 
 8. See infra Section II.C.1.c. 
 9. See infra Section IV.A. 
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distaste for forcing a private organization to proclaim a message with which 
it disagrees. Furthermore, the California courts have already been overruled 
when they tried to force an organization to spread the message of a third 
party.10 Therefore, the decision in A Woman’s Friend should be replaced 
with the stricter scrutiny applied in the Second Circuit’s Evergreen case. 
This Note covers the origins and expansion of the compelled speech 
doctrine. It further highlights commercial speech and professional speech, 
as well as the Ninth Circuit’s creation of the Pickup continuum to evaluate 
professional speech cases. The Note lays out the precedent regarding speech 
related to abortion cases. The Note next discusses A Woman’s Friend and 
contrasts that decision with the Evergreen case from the Second Circuit. The 
Note concludes that the Second Circuit’s Evergreen case was correctly 
decided and that the court in A Woman’s Friend should have followed the 
reasoning in Evergreen, striking down California’s Act. 
II.  BACKGROUND: FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO  
MODERN COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE 
The First Amendment’s application has grown from protecting the right 
to speak to also protecting the right not to speak. This right not to speak is 
often referred to as the compelled speech doctrine. This doctrine has grown 
over the years, and has been split up into many categories. In a compelled 
speech case, the court must decide what category of speech is implicated 
and which standard of review should be applied. For instance, commercial 
speech is subject to a four-part test, whereas regular compelled speech 
generally receives heightened scrutiny. As may be expected, the circuits are 
not always consistent in how they handle categories and standards of 
review; nor are they consistent in how they apply the facts to the standards 
of review. When abortion is involved, the courts have become even more 
conflicted. 
A. The First Amendment Basis 
The First Amendment forbids Congress from “abridging the freedom of 
speech.”11 Originally, the Bill of Rights only applied to the federal 
government. After the Civil War and the passage of the Fourteenth 
                                                                                                                                      
 10. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.”). 
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Amendment, the Supreme Court found that many of the rights found in the 
Bill of Rights are incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, forcing the 
states to acknowledge certain rights. Near the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the Supreme Court declared the freedom of speech to be a 
fundamental right, which is only restricted in the face of a “clear and 
present danger.”12 Once the fundamental right was established, the 
challenge of determining when and how it applied in different situations 
began. 
B. The Supreme Court Recognizes the Compelled Speech Doctrine 
In 1943, during World War II, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
First Amendment protected both the right to speak as well as the right not 
to speak. Though first applied to educational settings, the compelled speech 
doctrine has now been applied to license plates, government grants, and 
professional institutions. The compelled speech doctrine was first 
enunciated in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.13 
1. The Compelled Speech Doctrine Forms  
In 1943, the Supreme Court recognized that the freedom to speak implies 
the freedom not to speak.14 Earlier, in 1942, the West Virginia legislature 
required all of its schools to conduct courses in a way that would foster the 
“principles and spirit of Americanism.”15 As a result, the children at school 
were required to salute and pledge allegiance to the American flag.16 
However, some students, who were Jehovah’s Witnesses, did not salute 
because they believed the flag was an image.17 According to the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, saluting an image violates the second commandment of Exodus 
                                                                                                                                      
 12. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is 
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create 
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a 
right to prevent.”). 
 13. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 14. Id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring) (“The right of freedom of thought and of religion 
as guaranteed by the Constitution against State action includes both the right to speak freely 
and the right to refrain from speaking at all, except insofar as essential operations of 
government may require it for the preservation of an orderly society . . . .”). 
 15. Id. at 625. 
 16. Id. at 627-29. 
 17. Id. at 629-30. 
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20:4-5.18 Thus, for religious reasons, the Jehovah’s Witnesses would not 
partake in a mandatory act of American patriotism. 
The Supreme Court declared that this requirement to pledge allegiance 
to the American flag violated a fundamental right as applied to the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.19 The Court declared, “If there is any fixed star 
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.”20 The Court reasoned that the right to differ on important matters 
that “touch the heart of the existing order” shows that the right is not “a 
mere shadow of freedom.”21 
The Court made this decision in spite of its recent ruling in Minersville 
School District v. Gobitis.22 Since the Court had upheld the mandatory 
pledge of allegiance in schools only three years earlier in Gobitis, Justice 
Black and Justice Douglas found it appropriate to add a concurring opinion 
justifying their change of mind.23 Aside from violating speech rights, they 
also viewed the mandatory pledge as violating the freedom of religion.24 
They reasoned that the mandatory pledge of allegiance was a “form of test 
oath” that has “always been abhorrent in the United States.”25 Justices Black 
and Douglas concluded that the mandatory pledge was “inconsistent with 
                                                                                                                                      
 18. Id. at 629. “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any 
thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the 
earth. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the LORD thy God am 
a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth 
generation of them that hate me.” Exodus 20:4-5 (KJV). 
 19. The Court stated that:  
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of 
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by 
the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, 
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be 
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638. 
 20. Id. at 642. 
 21. Id. at 642. 
 22. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. 
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 23. Id. at 643 (Black, Douglas, J.J., concurring). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 644. 
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our Constitution’s plan and purpose.”26 In the end, the Court overruled 
Gobitis, thereby creating a precedent for the compelled speech doctrine.27  
2. Expanding the Compelled Speech Doctrine in Wooley v. Maynard28 
In Wooley, the Supreme Court declared that making a citizen promote a 
state’s message on his license plate—essentially becoming a “mobile 
billboard”—violated the compelled speech doctrine.29 Since 1969, New 
Hampshire had required license plates to display the state motto: “Live Free 
or Die.”30 A Jehovah’s Witness covered up the state motto because he 
disagreed with the political message.31 On the second offense, the defendant 
was sentenced with a fifty dollar fine and six months in the Grafton County 
House of Correction.32 The Court framed the issue as whether the State 
could make a person display the state’s message on his private property in a 
place where it could be observed by the public.33 
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, declaring 
unconstitutional the mandate to display the state motto on an individual’s 
license plate.34 The Court declared that the “right to speak and the right to 
refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader 
concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”35 While the Court admitted that 
the majority of Americans would deem the statute acceptable, it reasoned 
that the First Amendment protects the rights of those who differ with the 
views of the majority.36 Thus, the state could not commandeer its citizens to 
                                                                                                                                      
 26. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 644. Black and Douglas said, “The ceremonial, when enforced 
against conscientious objectors, more likely to defeat than to serve its high purpose, is a 
handy implement for disguised religious persecution.” Id. 
 27. Id. at 642. 
 28. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 29. Id. at 715. 
 30. Id. at 707. 
 31. Id. at 707-08. 
 32. Id. at 708. On the first offense, the defendant had been fined twenty-five dollars. Id. 
 33. The Court provided the following holding: 
We are thus faced with the question of whether the State may constitutionally 
require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological 
message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the 
express purpose that it be observed and read by the public. We hold that the 
State may not do so. 
Id. at 713 
 34. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717. 
 35. Id. at 714. 
 36. Id. at 715. 
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advertise the state’s message, even when the message was on a state-issued 
license plate. 
3. Removing the Disagreement Requirement in AID v. Open Society37  
As the Court dealt with compelled speech cases, it sometimes removed 
what were thought to be essential elements required for the compelled 
speech doctrine to apply. For instance, in AID v. Open Society, the Court 
decided that the individual does not need to disagree with the government 
message in order to be justified in not saying the message.38 In that case, the 
Supreme Court dealt with the Leadership Act of 2003, an act that was 
designed to combat HIV/AIDS overseas; Congress attached funding to a 
mandate that the accepting organization declare that it opposes prostitution 
and sex trafficking.39 Some corporations feared that making such a 
declaration would alienate them from certain governments that they 
worked with.40  
The Court struck down the mandate in the Leadership Act.41 While the 
Court recognized the policy that Congress wanted to achieve, it maintained 
that there is “a basic First Amendment principle that ‘freedom of speech 
prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.’”42 
Congress could not require these organizations to “pledge allegiance to the 
Government’s policy of eradicating prostitution.”43 The Court reasoned that 
Congress violated the compelled speech doctrine when it required the 
organizations to “profess a specific belief.”44  
AID shows how far the compelled speech doctrine can extend. For the 
compelled speech doctrine to apply, the organization may even believe the 
message that the state wants to promote. But for business reasons, the 
organization may simply not want to say the message. Under the compelled 
speech doctrine, the organization would still be protected by the First 
Amendment. 
                                                                                                                                      
 37. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013). 
 38. Id. at 2332. 
 39. Id. at 2326. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 2332. 
 42. Id. at 2327 (internal citations omitted). 
 43. Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2332. 
 44. Id. at 2330. 
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C. Categories of the Compelled Speech Doctrine 
The compelled speech doctrine has been applied in various situations, 
and the courts have struggled with determining the extent of its application 
and the level of scrutiny to apply. To help aid the courts, the Supreme Court 
has created certain categories of compelled speech and has assigned them 
general levels of scrutiny. With professional speech, courts generally apply 
either strict or intermediate scrutiny. With commercial speech, courts apply 
a four-part test.  
1. Professional Speech 
The professional speech doctrine deals with how extensively the state 
may regulate the speech of professionals who are licensed by the state. The 
Supreme Court has not officially recognized the existence of the 
professional speech doctrine, but Justice Jackson and Justice White have 
mentioned it in concurring opinions. These two justices no longer serve on 
the Supreme Court, and with only their two concurring opinions to rely on, 
some circuits have defined professional speech doctrines for their 
jurisdictions. For instance, the Ninth Circuit has created the Pickup factors 
in an attempt to deal with professional speech.   
a. Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Collins45 
Justice Jackson was the first of the two Supreme Court justices to 
mention the professional speech doctrine. In Thomas v. Collins, Justice 
Jackson illustrated his view of the professional speech doctrine with his 
belief that a “state may forbid one without its license to practice law as a 
vocation.”46 He thought the state “could not stop an unlicensed person from 
making a speech about the rights of man or the rights of labor, or any other 
kind of right, including recommending that his hearers organize to support 
his views.”47 Considering the medical field, Justice Jackson stated that “the 
state may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without its 
license, but I do not think it could make it a crime publicly or privately to 
speak urging persons to follow or reject any school of medical thought.”48 
                                                                                                                                      
 45. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945). 
 46. Id. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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b. Justice White in Lowe v. S.E.C.49  
Crediting Justice Jackson’s guidance from Thomas, Justice White 
suggested in Lowe v. S.E.C. that one “who takes the affairs of a client 
personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the client 
in the light of the client’s individual needs and circumstances is properly 
viewed as engaging in the practice of a profession.”50 Justice White reasoned 
that just “as offer and acceptance are communications incidental to the 
regulable [sic] transaction called a contract, the professional’s speech is 
incidental to the conduct of the profession.”51 
Justice White went on to say that the state has legitimate power to license 
those who would practice a profession, and that this is “no more subject to 
constitutional attack than state-imposed limits on those who may practice 
the professions of law and medicine.”52 Justice White finished by saying that 
applying the act’s enforcement provisions “to prevent unregistered persons 
from engaging in the business of publishing investment advice for the 
benefit of any who would purchase their publications, however, is a direct 
restraint on freedom of speech and of the press subject to the searching 
scrutiny called for by the First Amendment.”53 
Thus, while Justices Jackson and White believed that professional speech 
should be a category of compelled speech, they have not given the circuits 
much guidance in how it should be applied. This has led circuits like the 
Ninth Circuit to form their own tests or continuums. Such circuit-created 
tests will stand until the Supreme Court either accepts or rejects them.  
c. The Ninth Circuit and the Pickup Factors 
The Ninth Circuit has developed the Pickup factors in order to determine 
the level of scrutiny that should be applied when the speech occurs in the 
context of medical regulation. In Pickup v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit 
resolved a conflict between two of its district courts regarding the place of 
professional speech.54 Both district court cases dealt with California’s Senate 
Bill 1172, which banned psychotherapists from sexual orientation change 
efforts (“SOCE”) of patients under the age of eighteen.55  
                                                                                                                                      
 49. Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985). 
 50. Id. at 232 (White, J., concurring). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 233. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
2871 (2014), and cert. denied sub nom. Welch v. Brown, 134 S. Ct. 2881 (2014). 
 55. Id. at 1223. 
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When this law was challenged on First Amendment grounds, the two 
district courts applied different levels of scrutiny and came to different 
conclusions. One district court held that the law was subject to strict 
scrutiny because it restricted the content of speech and particular 
viewpoints, a fact that was not changed by reason of it being a professional 
regulation.56 This district court granted relief because it held that the state 
was unlikely to satisfy strict scrutiny.57 In the other district court case, the 
court found that the case was about treatment rather than speech.58 Thus, 
the court applied only a rational basis level of scrutiny, and found that the 
plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail, so it denied relief.59 The two courts came 
to different results because they used different standards of review. 
To resolve this conflict, the Ninth Circuit discussed two precedent cases 
and distilled their reasoning down into what is known as the Pickup 
factors.60 The court declared that communication that occurs during 
psychoanalysis is speech, and thus entitled to First Amendment protection; 
the court reasoned that such speech was not immune from regulation, 
especially given “California’s strong interest in regulating mental health,” an 
interest that the court declared a “valid exercise of its police power.”61  
To determine the level of scrutiny, the court laid out a continuum.62 On 
one end of the continuum, the highest level of scrutiny applies when the 
professional is “engaged in a public dialogue,” such as when a doctor 
advocates an unpopular treatment.63 At the midpoint of the continuum, the 
First Amendment protections are “somewhat diminished” when the speech 
occurs within the “confines of a professional relationship”; the court 
admitted that speech outside of the professional relationship would “almost 
certainly be considered impermissible compelled speech.”64 And at the 
other end of the continuum, the First Amendment affords the least 
protection where the regulation regards professional conduct, which the 
court declared to only have an incidental effect on speech.65  
                                                                                                                                      
 56. Id. at 1224. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 1225. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Brown, 740 F.3d at 1227. 
 61. Id. at 1226. 
 62. Id. at 1227. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 1228. 
 65. Id. at 1229. 
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The court compared the state’s ban of a particular treatment of words 
with banning a particular drug.66 It found that this case only called for a 
rational basis level of review.67 Accordingly, the court held that the law only 
prohibited licensed health providers from engaging in conversion therapy 
with minors, and thus satisfied rational basis scrutiny.68 
The creation of the Pickup factors came with a strong dissent from three 
judges who wanted to hear the case en banc.69 The dissent declared that 
there was a false distinction between “conduct” and “speech.”70 It asserted 
that the “government’s ipse dixit cannot transform ‘speech’ into ‘conduct’ 
that it may more freely regulate.”71 It later proclaimed that the “legislatures 
cannot nullify the First Amendment’s protections for speech by playing this 
labeling game.”72  
The dissent further warned that the Supreme Court has disapproved of 
the inferior courts carving out categories where the First Amendment 
would not apply.73 Since the Ninth Circuit did not find any cases holding 
that professional speech did not actually constitute “speech” under the First 
Amendment, the dissent declared that the Ninth Circuit should not be 
surprised if the Supreme Court did not recognize the new category.74 Due to 
the split in the circuits, the dissent may see its prediction come true. 
2. Commercial Speech 
The commercial speech doctrine relates to speech that is economic in 
nature, such as advertising. With commercial speech, the courts apply a test 
higher than minimal scrutiny. Commercial speech is admittedly difficult for 
the courts to apply. Thus, a test has been developed to determine whether 
speech falls under the commercial speech doctrine. It is very difficult for a 
plaintiff to win in a compelled speech challenge that is classified under the 
commercial speech doctrine. Therefore, this lower standard of review is 
desired by the state when defending its statutes. 
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a. Zauderer and Identifying Commercial Speech75 
For commercial speech, the Court only requires that a statute satisfy a 
four-part test. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the state 
required lawyers to insert information in their advertisements that clients 
would be liable for significant litigation costs, even if the lawsuit were 
unsuccessful.76 The Court held that such a state rule was valid under the 
First Amendment, noting that the state only wanted the lawyers to add a 
little more information to advertisements.77 Hence, the Supreme Court 
clarified that some state laws that compel speech may violate the First 
Amendment, but other compelled speech is permissible when the State only 
attempts to “prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising.”78 
With advertising, the Court only requires that the law be “reasonably 
related to the State’s interest in preventing” customers from being 
deceived.79 Thus, while one “may not be disciplined for soliciting legal 
business through printed advertising containing truthful and nondeceptive 
information and advice regarding the legal rights of potential clients,”80 that 
person is not afforded the same level of protection for “commercial speech” 
as he would receive under “noncommercial speech.”81 
b. Central Hudson Gas and the Four-Part Test82 
Once the Supreme Court recognized commercial speech as a special 
form of speech with less protections, it tried to define it. In Central Hudson 
Gas, the Court defined commercial speech as an “expression related solely 
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”83 With 
commercial speech, the Court balanced its fear of becoming “highly 
paternalistic” with the state’s interest in protecting consumers.84  
When addressing this situation, the Court balanced these interests with a 
four-part analysis. First, the court must determine whether the First 
Amendment protects the expression.85 For commercial speech, this requires 
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that the expression be lawful and not misleading.86 Second, the court must 
consider whether the government interest is substantial.87 Only when both 
of these questions are answered in the affirmative will the court consider the 
next two parts of the test: “whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest.”88 Since this test is very deferential to the 
state, the state has an obvious incentive to argue that it applies in any given 
case.  
D. Compelled Speech Applied to the Abortion Issue 
Regarding abortion, the courts often look to Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.89 In that case, the Court mentioned the 
compelled speech doctrine near the end of the opinion in a short 
paragraph.90 The Circuits have debated the meaning of that short paragraph 
and have come to different conclusions, especially regarding the level of 
scrutiny that should be applied in cases surrounding abortion clinics. 
1. The Supreme Court References the Compelled Speech Doctrine in 
Casey 
In Casey, the Court considered a state statute’s informed consent 
mandate requiring that, before an abortion, the physician must make 
available certain printed materials describing the unborn baby and other 
information such as a list of other services that serve as alternatives to 
abortion.91 Regarding the First Amendment’s compelled speech doctrine, 
the Court dealt with the issue in a short paragraph, stating that the 
“physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated . . . but 
only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and 
regulation by the State . . . .”92 The Court further clarified, “[w]e see no 
constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the 
information mandated by the State here.”93 This short analysis has led to a 
circuit split, since different circuits have come to different conclusions as to 
the extent of its meaning and application. 
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2. The Circuits Interpret the Supreme Court 
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits are split as to what level of scrutiny should 
be used when a state regulates the disclosures an abortion doctor must 
make. The Fifth Circuit held that Casey dictated that informed consent laws 
did not violate the compelled speech doctrine.94 The Fourth Circuit, on the 
other hand, held that Casey did not dictate any standard in that short 
paragraph, and further declared that a higher scrutiny should be used.95 In 
that case, the Fourth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny and struck down 
the statute.96 
a. The Fifth Circuit: Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion 
Services. v. Lakey97 
In Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, the 
Fifth Circuit applied a rational basis review to Texas’s statute requiring 
informed consent by women who undergo abortions.98 After considering 
Casey, the Fifth Circuit asserted that the Supreme Court upheld an 
“informed-consent statute over precisely the same ‘compelled speech’ 
challenges made here.”99 The court noted that the Supreme Court explained 
that informed-consent statutes helped women comprehend the full 
consequence of their decision, and the statute also furthered the State’s 
interest in protecting life.100 When the Fifth Circuit evaluated Casey, the 
court declared that the Supreme Court’s response to compelled speech 
under this situation is “clearly not a strict scrutiny analysis.”101 
b. The Fourth Circuit in Stuart v. Camnitz102 
Taking a different view than Lakey, the Fourth Circuit, in Stuart v. 
Camnitz, claimed that the Fifth Circuit read too much into Casey.103 The 
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Fourth Circuit did not believe that the Casey holding was a “particularized 
finding” and, thus, did not apply to “every subsequent compelled speech 
case involving abortion.”104 Because Casey (under the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation) did not establish a level of scrutiny, the Fourth Circuit 
considered its heightened intermediate level of scrutiny to be consistent 
with Supreme Court precedent.105 
c. The Second Circuit and Mandatory Disclosures: Evergreen106 
In contrast to certain states trying to force disclosures regarding services, 
other states have attempted to advertise their programs by state law. In 
Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, the Second Circuit considered whether 
New York City could mandate pregnancy service centers to inform 
potential clients about the centers and the services that New York City 
provided or did not provide.107 The New York City Council passed a law 
that imposed on pregnancy service centers certain confidentiality 
requirements and mandatory disclosures, such as (1) whether the 
pregnancy service center had a licensed medical provider who directly 
supervised the organization (the “Status Disclosure”), (2) that the New York 
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene encourages women who 
are or who may be pregnant to consult with a licensed provider (the 
“Government Message”), and (3) whether the organization “provide or 
provide referrals for abortion,” emergency contraception, or prenatal care 
(the “Services Disclosure”).108 The law required that the pregnancy service 
centers provide the required disclosures at their entrances and waiting 
rooms, on advertisements, and during telephone conversations.109 If this law 
was violated, it provided civil fines and granted authority to the 
Commissioner of Consumer Affairs to close down the center.110 
The Evergreen Association, Inc. and three other pregnancy resource 
centers moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the law from taking 
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effect.111 They claimed that the law violated their First Amendment free 
speech rights.112 Evergreen provides pregnancy-related services that include 
pregnancy testing, counseling, ultrasounds, and sonograms.113 On appeal, 
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court, regarding mandated forms, 
and held that the law violated the plaintiff’s free speech rights.114 Regarding 
the level of scrutiny, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the district court 
had rejected the defendant’s arguments for a level of scrutiny lower than 
strict scrutiny.115 These arguments included comparisons to campaign 
finance regulations, regulation of licensed physicians, and commercial 
speech.116  
The Second Circuit reasoned that it did not need to resolve the level of 
scrutiny because the result would be the same under both intermediate and 
strict scrutiny.117 The court found that the Government Message and 
Service Disclosure violated the First Amendment, but the Status Disclosure 
was constitutional.118 Regarding Status Disclosures, the court held that this 
provision survived strict scrutiny because it is the “least restrictive means to 
ensure that a woman is aware” that a particular pregnancy services center 
has a licensed medical provider “at the time that she first interacts with 
it.”119 Regarding the Services Disclosure, the court found that the Services 
Disclosures overly burdened Plaintiff’s speech, especially under strict 
scrutiny.120  
The court reasoned that the context of the speech dealt with a “public 
debate over the morality and efficacy of contraception and abortions.”121 
The court further reasoned that a requirement that pregnancy services 
centers address abortion, emergency contraception, or prenatal care when 
they first meet potential clients alters the center’s political speech “by 
mandating the manner in which the discussion of these issues begins.”122  
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Under intermediate scrutiny, the court reasoned that the law would still 
be invalid because of the nature of the political speech and “the fact that the 
Status Disclosure provides a more limited alternative regulation.”123 
Regarding the Government Message, the court held that it is insufficiently 
tailored to withstand scrutiny.124 The court was concerned that pregnancy 
centers were being required to advertise for the City pursuant to New York 
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.125 The court declared that 
the government cannot mandate that a person espouse a government 
position on a contested public issue.126  
III.  PROBLEM: A WOMAN’S FRIEND PREGNANCY RESOURCE CLINIC V. 
HARRIS 
Once again, the compelled speech doctrine has found itself caught in an 
abortion conflict. In A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Resource Clinic v. Harris, 
the question was whether a state can make a pro-life organization inform 
everyone who walks into its office that the state provides low cost 
abortions.127 Pro-life institutions challenged this statute as a violation of the 
First Amendment under both the compelled speech doctrine and the Free 
Exercise Clause.128  
A. Overview of the Case 
California passed an act mandating organizations that perform 
pregnancy testing to inform their clients that California provides low-cost 
access to abortions.129 A Women’s Friend Pregnancy Resource Clinic (“A 
Woman’s Friend”), a pro-life organization, challenged California’s 
statute.130 This pro-life institution claimed that the statute violated the 
compelled speech doctrine and First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.131  
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1. The Statute: Reproductive FACT Act 
The California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive 
Care, and Transparency Act (“the Act”) requires “licensed covered 
facilit[ies]” to post a notice saying, “California has public programs that 
provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family 
planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), 
prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women. To determine whether you 
qualify, contact the county social services office . . . .”132 The Act requires 
that the notice be disclosed in the following ways: posted in “a conspicuous 
place where individuals wait that may be easily read by those seeking 
services from the facility”; printed and distributed “to all clients in no less 
than 14-point type”; or provide digital notice “distributed to all clients that 
can be read at the time of check-in or arrival.”133  
The Act defines “licensed covered facilities” as facilities that offer 
“pregnancy testing or pregnancy diagnosis” or that “advertise or solicit 
patrons with offers to provide prenatal sonography, pregnancy tests, or 
pregnancy options counseling.”134 The Act also applies to a facility that has 
“staff or volunteers who collect health information from clients.”135 The Act 
imposes civil penalties of $500 for the first offense and $1,000 for 
subsequent offenses.136 
2. A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Resources Clinic 
A Woman’s Friend is a non-profit religious corporation licensed under 
the California Health and Safety Code.137 A Woman’s Friend was organized 
for “the express purpose of providing alternatives to abortion for women 
experiencing unplanned pregnancies.”138 A Woman’s Friend believes that 
the Bible is the Word of God and that Jesus is the savior of the world.139 
Thus, A Woman’s Friend “requires its employees, volunteers, and board 
members to read and sign a statement of faith.”140  
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Regarding its operation, A Woman’s Friend consists of medical doctors, 
a doctor of obstetrics and gynecology, and several registered nurses.141 A 
Woman’s Friend offers services such as pre-parenting classes as well as 
“used and new children’s clothing, maternity clothing, baby furniture, and 
other childcare supplies.”142 A Woman’s Friend directs its clients to nurses 
who administer a pregnancy test, and the nurses teach the clients about 
“prenatal health and well-being, nutrition, and fetal development and offers 
to perform a limited first trimester ultrasound.”143 A Woman’s Friend 
argues that the Act compels it to “make a statement” contradicting both its 
“religious belief and the purposes of [its] formation.”144 
B. Legal Issues Addressed by the District Court 
The district court in A Woman’s Friend decided that the case involved 
speech, not just conduct.145 The district court then declared that the speech 
fell into the category of professional speech, not commercial speech.146 The 
court held that intermediate scrutiny applied and the statute survived this 
standard.147 The court also analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard and 
declared that the statute would meet this standard as well.148 
1. Speech Versus Conduct 
At trial, A Woman’s Friend contended that strict scrutiny should be 
applied because “the required notice amounts to a content-based 
regulation.”149 On the other hand, the state argued that a lesser level of 
scrutiny should be applied, such as compelled commercial speech or 
professional speech.150 The district court found that the “Act regulates 
professional speech within the confines of the patient-provider relationship, 
which is reviewed under no greater than intermediate scrutiny.”151 
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2. Commercial Speech 
The court dispensed with the state’s argument regarding commercial 
speech.152 It reasoned that under Central Hudson Gas, commercial speech 
resulted when the expression related solely to the economic interests of the 
speaker.153 It also examined the compelled speech doctrine as seen in Riley 
v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina.154 In Riley,155 the state 
required that professional fundraisers disclose to potential donors the 
percentage of the donation retained by the organization (not making it to 
the charity’s target).156 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth 
Circuit and found that the statute violated the compelled speech doctrine.157 
The Court reasoned that the statute mandated speech that the speaker 
would not want to say.158 The Court maintained that the case could not be 
separated from other compelled speech cases because the compelled 
statements were facts.159 Thus, the Court found that the state’s regulation “is 
subject to exacting First Amendment scrutiny.”160 The Court maintained 
that the statute was unduly burdensome and not narrowly tailored.161 
The district court found this case more closely related to Riley than to the 
commercial speech cases.162 The court noted that when speech is 
“inextricably intertwined” with protected speech, the court views the speech 
as fully protected.163 Thus, the court ruled that A Woman’s Friend’s speech 
was more than economic, because it was “integrally connected to their 
religious and political beliefs, and the speech required by the Act brushe[d] 
up against a controversial public debate revolving around abortion.”164 
Therefore, the court concluded that, because the speech was not 
commercial speech, the test in Zauderer did not apply.165 
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3. Professional Speech 
After deciding that the Commercial Speech doctrine did not apply, the 
court then held that the Act regulated professional speech.166 The court 
noted that the Act’s “primary purpose is to communicate information to 
patients about reproductive medical services.”167 Therefore, the court 
applied the Pickup continuum.168 
While the court referenced the Casey decision, it decided that Casey did 
not provide enough guidance.169 And the court acknowledged that the 
“framework for professional speech remained murky at best.”170 The court 
also acknowledged the split in the circuits, and noted that the 
interpretations would inevitably vary significantly when based on a single 
paragraph of guidance from the Supreme Court.171  
The district court next used the Pickup continuum from Pickup v. 
Brown172 to decide what level of scrutiny to apply.173 In the Pickup 
continuum, the First Amendment protects professionals engaged “in public 
dialogue on matters of public concern,” and it provides the least protection 
where the state regulates professional conduct.174 Between these two poles, 
the district court listed examples such as “consent requirements, licensing 
requirements, professional disciplinary proceedings, and negligence 
actions.”175 
Applying this Pickup continuum, the district court reasoned that the Act 
did not stop any professionals from engaging in public dialogue.176 The 
court described the compelled speech as “truthful, nonmisleading 
information to clinics’ clients.”177 The court maintained that the Act’s 
purpose is to “regulate[] speech within the confines of a professional 
relationship,” not to suppress a message.178 Further, the court found that the 
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midpoint of the continuum received “somewhat diminished” First 
Amendment protection, but the level of protection was not specified.179 
Thus, the court analyzed the case as a professional speech case at the 
midpoint of the Ninth Circuit’s Pickup continuum with “somewhat 
diminished” First Amendment protection. 
C. Levels of Scrutiny and Application 
After consulting the Fourth and Fifth Amendment for guidance on what 
level of scrutiny to apply, the district court decided that this case fell under 
intermediate scrutiny.180 It then found that the Act satisfied intermediate 
scrutiny.181 Finally, the district court analyzed the case under strict scrutiny, 
and found that the Act satisfied strict scrutiny as well.182  
1. The Court Analyzes with Intermediate Scrutiny 
The district court stated that the Act would survive intermediate scrutiny 
if it (1) directly advanced a substantial government interest and (2) was 
narrowly “drawn to achieve that interest.”183 The court held that the Act 
survived intermediate scrutiny.184 The court reasoned that the Act’s purpose 
is to inform California residents of “their rights and the health care 
resources available to them” regarding reproductive health care.185 The 
court maintained that California had a strong interest in women knowing 
“the range of health care options available to them.”186 The court stated that 
the California legislature found that thousands of women did not know of 
the public programs.187 The court found that the Act advanced this 
substantial government interest.188  
Next, the court found that the Act is narrowly “drawn to achieve that 
interest and does not overly burden speech.”189 The court reasoned that the 
term “abortion” was surrounded by many words that dealt with other 
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California provided health care services unrelated to abortions.190 The court 
noted that every institution is still free to advocate its viewpoint, including 
any disagreement with the statute.191 The court also emphasized the 
different options that the Act gave the organization to inform its clients of 
California’s provision of low-cost abortion.192 The court held that this 
evidence showed that the Act is narrowly drawn to achieve its interest and 
provide “manageable options.”193 
2.  The Court Analyzes with Strict Scrutiny 
The district court stated that the Act passes strict scrutiny if (1) it is 
“narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest,” and (2) it 
uses the “least restrictive means to achieve its ends.”194 Concluding that 
California’s interest is likely a compelling governmental interest, the court 
held that the Act survives strict scrutiny.195 The court maintained that other 
methods, such as persuading private institutions to spread the desired 
information or the government disseminating the information itself, were 
not “the most effective” to ensure women “quickly obtain . . . publically 
funded family planning and pregnancy-related resources available in 
California” at the time that these decisions are being made.196 Since 
pregnancy decisions are time-sensitive, the court held that the Act’s 
required notice passed strict scrutiny.197 
3. The Court Distinguishes A Woman’s Friend from Evergreen198 
The district court claimed that it had considered the Second Circuit’s 
Evergreen case, but then asserted that Evergreen did not change the court’s 
conclusion.199 While the court noted that the Second Circuit struck down 
the government message because it overly burdened speech and mandated 
pregnancy centers to “affirmatively espouse the government’s position on a 
contested public issue,”200 the court distinguished the Act’s notice 
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requirements from the disclosures in Evergreen.201 The court reasoned that 
the Act seeks to advance a different government interest.202  
The district court claimed that the Act resembles informed consent cases 
rather than free speech cases because the Act informs women of the free 
and low-cost publicly funded health services available to them “at the time 
they are making their time-sensitive reproductive decisions.”203 The court 
further distinguished A Woman’s Friend from Evergreen based on the 
language of the two statutes.204 The court reasoned that the notice in the Act 
only provided facts of health services available, which was unlike the 
Government Message in Evergreen wherein the government encouraged 
women to consult a licensed provider.205 Moreover, unlike the requirement 
in Evergreen that the centers were required to provide the disclosures at the 
beginning of each contact with a client, the Act only required that the 
message be posted on a wall.206 Thus, the court held that the Act’s burden of 
speech did not match the burden in Evergreen.  
4. The Ninth Circuit Affirms the Result of the District Court 
In a similar case regarding the same statute, the Ninth Circuit, in 
National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, upheld the Act.207 
Several pro-life organizations challenged the Act, but the district court held 
that these organizations were unlikely to succeed on their free speech 
claim.208 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court.209  
In deciding the level of scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that, even 
though the Act engaged in content-based discrimination, strict scrutiny did 
not apply.210 The court looked to Casey, specifically where the Supreme 
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Court had said that the practice of medicine is “subject to reasonable 
licensing and regulation by the State.”211 The Ninth Circuit discussed several 
cases such as Stuart and Lakey to show that strict scrutiny is not always 
applied to compelled speech cases concerning abortion-related 
disclosures.212 Thus, the Ninth Circuit applied its own framework using the 
Pickup factors. It concluded that the licensed notice is professional speech, 
subject to intermediate scrutiny, because the licensed notices fell at the 
midpoint of the Pickup continuum.213 The court expanded the professional 
speech doctrine to include not only the words of the professional, but also 
the words of the other staff members, and even what information is placed 
in the waiting room.214  
Further, the Ninth Circuit held that the licensed notices survived 
intermediate scrutiny.215 It declared that California had a substantial interest 
in the health of its citizens.216 This interest includes that citizens have 
adequate access to information about “constitutionally-protected medical 
services like abortion.”217 The court further concluded that the licensed 
notice was narrowly tailored to achieve California’s interest.218 The court 
reasoned that the notice only informed the reader of the existence of 
publicly-funded family planning services.219 The court deemed this to be 
reasonable and sufficient for intermediate scrutiny, but it acknowledged 
that the Second and Fourth Circuits had applied strict scrutiny in similar 
cases and had found similar laws to not be narrowly tailored.220 In the end, 
the Ninth Circuit declared that its lower standard of review allowed the Act 
to survive scrutiny. 
IV.  EVERGREEN MUST PREVAIL 
While the Pickup continuum of the Ninth Circuit creates a lower level of 
scrutiny similar to intermediate scrutiny, the debate is not what standard of 
review should be used. The debate regards how the standard of review is 
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applied to the statute at issue. Both A Woman’s Friend and Evergreen 
applied strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny to similar facts, but came 
to opposite conclusions. The district court in A Woman’s Friend declared 
that the state satisfied both strict and intermediate scrutiny, but the Second 
Circuit in Evergreen held that the state failed under both. The solution to 
resolving the conflict between A Woman’s Friend and the Second Circuit’s 
Evergreen case is to simply follow the reasoning of the Second Circuit in 
Evergreen. 
A. The Act Is Not Distinguished from the Evergreen Case 
While the court in A Woman’s Friend claimed to distinguish its case 
from the situation in Evergreen, the cases are not distinguishable. Much of 
the reasoning and policy concerns from Evergreen would be equally 
offended by the Act in California. Thus, because Evergreen found that the 
statute in its case failed both intermediate and strict scrutiny, the situation 
in A Woman’s Friend should likewise fail under both strict and intermediate 
scrutiny. 
1.  The State Is Commandeering a Private Organization for 
Advertising 
The Second Circuit in Evergreen was concerned that the state was 
commandeering a private organization to advertise on behalf of the state.221 
The district court in A Woman’s Friend did not deny that the state of 
California is using private organizations to promote a state-funded 
government program. Thus, it is admitted that California is forcing pro-life 
facilities to be rooms of advertising for California programs.  
According to Evergreen, this commandeering offends the Constitution 
even if it is clear that the message is known to come from the 
government.222 To support this, the Second Circuit relied on Wooley v. 
Maynard, a case in which the Supreme Court declared that the state could 
not force its citizens to become advertising billboards for the state.223 In A 
Woman’s Friend, the advertising billboard of Wooley has been moved from 
public view on the road to the inside wall of a private organization. The 
Court in Wooley declared that the private individual’s ability to disagree 
with the message on his car was not sufficient to allow the state to compel 
the speech. Thus, it is similarly not sufficient that the private organizations 
in A Woman’s Friend can openly disagree with the message. 
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Furthermore, the district court in A Woman’s Friend reasoned that the 
mandated speech is less burdensome than in Evergreen because the Act 
states that the organization can put the message on a wall instead of telling 
the customer verbally.224 But, this is a distinction without a difference. The 
Act is still forcing the organizations to promote a message with which they 
disagree.225 Changing the medium of that message does not solve anything. 
That argument is akin to telling a Jehovah’s Witness that he does not have 
to say the pledge of allegiance, but he has to put it on his car. Both of these 
scenarios in Evergreen and A Woman’s Friend involve a statute that requires 
a private organization to declare the message of the state, and both make 
private parties affirm a government message to the public.  
2.  The State Is Forcing a Private Organization to State a Message with 
Which It Disagrees 
A Woman’s Friend was organized for “the express purpose of providing 
alternatives to abortion for women experiencing unplanned pregnancies.”226 
And, as shown in AID, honest disagreement is not even required in 
compelled speech. In fact, had the organization truly agreed with the 
message, but simply declined to promote it, the compelled speech doctrine 
would still have applied. 
Moreover, the debate over the professional speech doctrine misses the 
fact that the organization itself has free speech rights, not just the medical 
physicians who work for the organization. While California may be able to 
restrict the speech of certain medical personnel, it should not be able to 
force an organization to proclaim a message that the organization disagrees 
with.  
B.  The Act Does Not Satisfy Either Strict or Intermediate Scrutiny 
The Ninth Circuit created two problems for the district court’s reasoning 
in A Woman’s Friend. First, the Ninth Circuit admitted that the Act does 
not survive strict scrutiny. Second, the Ninth Circuit erred in stating that 
the Second Circuit applied only strict scrutiny. In Evergreen, the Second 
Circuit applied both strict and intermediate scrutiny and held that the 
statute failed under both.227 Therefore, even though the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the overall reasoning of A Woman’s Friend, it undermined it in two 
acute areas. 
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As in the Second Circuit’s Evergreen case, the state did not satisfy either 
strict or intermediate scrutiny.228 The Second Circuit held that it failed 
under both standards, due to the issue being one of public contention.229 It 
also failed because there were more limited alternatives, such as 
implementing a government advertising campaign.230 Both critiques ring 
true in A Woman’s Friend. Abortion is a controversial issue in most of the 
United States and, as shown in the facts of the case itself, California is no 
exception. The fact that California funds abortions while other private 
groups oppose abortions shows that the issue is controversial even within 
that state. Further, the use of an advertising campaign is the way the state 
should do its own advertising, not commandeering the waiting rooms of 
organizations that disagree with the state’s program. 
C.  The Lesson of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of 
California231 
California courts have already been reversed in a similar situation 
regarding a private organization that was compelled to become an 
advertiser for another organization. In Pacific Gas, the California Public 
Utility Commission permitted a third party to print information in the 
billing statements of Pacific Gas and Electric Company.232 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court remanded the case back to the California Supreme Court 
with guidance.233 The Supreme Court held that the Commission’s order 
“impermissibly burdens” Pacific Gas’s First Amendment rights because it 
forces Pacific Gas “to associate with the views of other speakers.”234 The 
Court reasoned that the order discriminated based on the viewpoints of the 
speakers by allowing a third party to disseminate information on a 
company’s billing statement.235 While the state’s interest in “fair and 
effective utility regulation” could be compelling, the Court could not find a 
substantially relevant correlation between the government interest and the 
decision to require another organization to associate with the message of a 
third party.236 The Court further found that the regulation was not content 
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neutral due to the conflicting messages that may result between the 
company and the third party.237 The Court found that the order was not 
narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.238 It also was not a 
valid time, place, or manner regulation.239 
Like the third-party speech in Pacific Gas, California is attempting to 
make a private organization promote a message with which it disagrees. 
When the state tried to hand this ability to a private organization in Pacific 
Gas, the Court struck it down under the compelled speech doctrine.240 
Likewise, in A Woman’s Friend, the state is attempting to get an 
organization to advertise on behalf of a government program. Thus, the 
organization would be forced to associate with the message of the 
government, a message with which the organization disagrees. Indeed, the 
organization is being forced to associate with a message that it was created 
to combat. Indeed, common sense dictates that a state should not be able to 
force its advertisements into any facility, especially those places designed to 
counteract that advertisement. Thus, the plight of A Woman’s Friend is 
even greater than that of the gas company in Pacific Gas. 
Moreover, the disagreement and communication is more visible in A 
Woman’s Friend than it was in Pacific Gas. In Pacific Gas, the conflicting 
message was buried in the billing statement, among the extra papers that its 
customers likely did not even read. In A Woman’s Friend, however, the 
message would be put in the waiting room where customers are trying to 
find something to do or read. That is why doctors provide magazines for 
their customers to peruse. In fact, the reason that the state wants this 
message printed in the waiting room is to reach the organization’s 
customers.241 The state argued that doing so helped get its message to its 
desired target group, those making “time-sensitive reproductive 
decisions.”242 
The disagreement with the message is stronger in A Woman’s Friend 
than it was in Pacific Gas. The Court in Pacific Gas overturned the 
Commission on the grounds that a conflicting message may result. In A 
Woman’s Friend, the disagreement with the message is inherent and 
obvious. The message that the state of California provides abortions goes 
                                                                                                                                      
 237. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Com., 475 U.S. 1, 13 (1986). 
 238. Id. at 21. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 20-21.  
 241. A Woman’s Friend, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1209. 
 242. Id.  
264 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:233 
 
against the stated purpose of the organization, causing the organization to 
challenge the compulsion as soon as it was able.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
In disregarding the guidance of the Evergreen case, the district court in A 
Woman’s Friend has erred by finding that the Act satisfied both strict and 
intermediate scrutiny. When the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision, it created a circuit split between the Ninth and Second Circuit. To 
fix this split, the Second Circuit and its Evergreen case should prevail. 
The Second Circuit’s reasoning in Evergreen is more consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s guidance concerning compelled speech cases, recognizing 
the policy against states commandeering private organizations for 
advertising purposes, and the distaste with forcing a private organization to 
proclaim a message with which it disagrees. Further, the California courts 
have already been overruled when they tried to force an organization to 
spread the message of a third party. Therefore, the decision in A Woman’s 
Friend, should be abandoned for the stricter scrutiny applied in the Second 
Circuit’s Evergreen case. 
 
 
 
 
